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Abstract
We present JHU’s system submission to the ASVspoof 2019
Challenge: Anti-Spoofing with Squeeze-Excitation and Resid-
ual neTworks (ASSERT). Anti-spoofing has gathered more and
more attention since the inauguration of the ASVspoof Chal-
lenges, and ASVspoof 2019 dedicates to address attacks from
all three major types: text-to-speech, voice conversion, and re-
play. Built upon previous research work on Deep Neural Net-
work (DNN), ASSERT is a pipeline for DNN-based approach to
anti-spoofing. ASSERT has four components: feature engineer-
ing, DNN models, network optimization and system combina-
tion, where the DNN models are variants of squeeze-excitation
and residual networks. We conducted an ablation study of the
effectiveness of each component on the ASVspoof 2019 corpus,
and experimental results showed that ASSERT obtained more
than 93% and 17% relative improvements over the baseline sys-
tems in the two sub-challenges in ASVspooof 2019, ranking
ASSERT one of the top performing systems. Code and pre-
trained models will be made publicly available.
Index Terms: ASVspoof, Anti-Spoofing, Speaker Verification
1. Introduction
Automatic Speaker Verification (ASV) has become an increas-
ingly attractive option for biometric authentication. Past re-
search has shown that ASV systems are subject to malicious at-
tacks: the presentation attacks. Presentation attacks, or spoofing
attacks, refer to attempts of bypassing ASV systems by mim-
icking the voice characteristics of the target speaker. Spoofing
attacks have four widely-recognized specifications: imperson-
ation, replay, text-to-speech (TTS) and voice conversion (VC).
To defend against these attacks, a standalone anti-spoofing sys-
tem is developed in parallel to the ASV system [1]. Recent
efforts on anti-spoofing developments mainly originated from
the Biennial ASVspoof Challenges [2, 3, 4].
Previous ASVspoof Challenges focused on promoting
awareness and fostering solutions to spoofing attacks generated
from TTS, VC and replay [2, 3, 4]. ASVspoof 2019 aims to ad-
dress all previous attacks and further extended previous editions
of ASVspoof in three aspects:
• Update attacks with TTS and VC with state-of-the-art
technologies, especially those based on neural networks.
• Create a more controlled setup for replay attacks, cover-
ing acoustic and microphone conditions and predefined
replay device qualities.
• Adopt an evaluation metric to assess impacts of stan-
dalone anti-spoofing systems to a fixed ASV system.
ASVspoof 2019 Challenge is composed of two sub-challenges:
Physical Access (PA) and Logical Access (LA). LA considers
spoofing attacks generated with TTS and VC, and PA refers to
spoofing attacks from replay.
Research work on anti-spoofing can be divided into one of
the three categories: Feature Learning [5, 6, 7, 8, 9, 10, 11, 12,
13, 14], Statistical Modeling [4, 15, 16, 17], and Deep Neu-
ral Network (DNN) [18, 19, 20, 21, 22, 23, 24, 25]. Having
witnessed the successes of DNNs in ASVspoof 2017, we de-
cided to explore and extend several DNN-based systems for
the ASVspoof 2019 Challenge. Our objective is to identify
and design core components of a working pipeline for DNN-
based approach to anti-spoofing. These components, feature
engineering, DNN models, network optimization, and system
fusion, make up our anti-spoofing system, which we term Anti-
Spoofing with Squeeze-Excitation and Residual neTworks, or
ASSERT. The main contribution of this paper is two-fold:
1. We conducted experiments on the effectiveness of sev-
eral DNN models in detecting spoofing attacks gener-
ated from audio replay, TTS and VC. The DNN mod-
els are based on variants of Squeeze-Excitation Network
(SENet) [26] and ResNet [27]. To our knowledge, we
were the first to introduce SENet and ResNet with sta-
tistical pooling to address anti-spoofing, and we also ex-
tended our previous work in [20] such that the DNNs are
deeper but faster-trained.
2. We presented an ablation study, from feature engineer-
ing, network optimization, to fusion schemes for training
DNN models for anti-spoofing. We believe these collec-
tive strategies are vital for the performance of DNNs. In
addition, we compared ASSERT with our implementa-
tion of i-vectors baselines [28]. Results on the ASVspoof
2019 corpus demonstrated that ASSERT achieved signif-
icant performances over the baseline systems, with more
than 93% and 17% relative improvements on PA and LA
respectively. Our fusion system was ranked 3rd in the PA
sub-challenge, and 14th in the LA sub-challenge.
The outline of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2
details ASSERT, from the feature engineering approaches, pro-
posed DNN models, to the optimization and fusion schemes.
Section 3 compares the results of ASSERT with the baseline
systems on the ASVspoof 2019 corpus. We ended the paper
with some concluding remarks in Section 4.
2. ASSERT
This section presents an overview of each component of AS-
SERT: input feature representations to DNN models, the DNN
models and their parameters, along with the network optimiza-
tion and fusion schemes. The feature preparation is either a
unified feature map or the whole utterance. Both approaches
are based on some low-level acoustic features. The DNN mod-
els are variants of squeeze-excitation and residual networks:
SENet34, SENet50, Mean-Std ResNet, Dilated ResNet, and
Attentive-Filtering Network.
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Figure 1: Illustration of Unified Feature Map approach. Low-
level acoustics feature are first extracted, and the utterance is
repeated to form a unified feature map. Then, the feature map is
broken down into segments with length M frames and overlap
L frames, before inputting into the DNN models.
2.1. Feature Engineering
Acoustic Features: We extracted two different acoustic fea-
tures: constant Q cepstral coefficients (CQCC) [5] and log
power magnitude spectra (logspec). Following [4], we extracted
30 dimension CQCC feature, including the 0’th order cepstral
coefficient and without CMVN. The dimension of logspec is
257. For both CQCC and logspec, we did not apply voice ac-
tivity detection nor any normalization to the acoustic features,
as we empirically found doing so yield better results.
Unified Feature Map1: We followed previous work [20] and
created a unified feature map as input to the DNN models. Since
the lengths of evaluation utterances were not known before-
hand, we first extended all utterances to multiple of M frames.
Then, the extended feature map was broken down into segments
of length M frames. The segments can have overlap L frames.
For the 2019 ASVspoof Challenge, M is set to 400, and
L is set to either 0 or 200. Figure 1 is an illustration of this
feature engineering approach. There may be multiple segments
per utterance. We simply averaged the DNN outputs over all
segments for each utterance.
Whole Utterance: In addition to the Unified Feature Map, we
considered another feature engineering approach by training
models with the whole utterance (variable length input). For
each minibatch during training, utterances are zero-padded to
match the length of the longest utterance. Padding frames are
subsequently removed in the pooling layer of the DNNs.
2.2. DNN model
Squeeze-Excitation Network: Given recent achievements
in spoofing countermeasures from different DNN architec-
tures [19, 20], we explored an extension of ResNet, Squeeze-
Excitation Network (SENet), for ASVspoof 2019. SENet
has attained impressive image classification results, where a
channel-wise transform is appended to existing DNN build-
ing blocks, such as the Residual unit [26]. We implemented
two variants of SENets: SEnet34 with ResNet34 backbone, and
SEnet50 with ResNet50 backbone. Table 1 contains the model
parameters of SEnet34 and SEnet50. SEnet34 and SEnet50
were trained with unified feature maps of logspec while each
minibatch contains 64 feature maps.
1This is not practical for long utterances, but spoofed speech are
mostly recorded in short duration (less than 10 seconds).
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Figure 2: (Bottom Left) Dilated ResNet is consisted of four
blocks followed by a fully-connected layer. Each block has five
residual units, a max-pooling layer, and a dilated convolution
layer. (Right) Attentive-Filtering applies an attention-based
masking prior to a Dilated ResNet. Input feature goes through
four downsampling and four upsampling units. Skip connection
is used throughout. Dilation indicates the dilation rate of each
convolution layer. Bilinear indicates bilinear upsampling.
Mean-Std ResNet: Recent work in speaker recognition [29,
30] has demonstrated that ResNet [27] with pooling achieves
comparable results as x-vectors [31]. Therefore, we intro-
duced ResNet with pooling for anti-spoofing. Specifically, we
employed Mean-Std ResNet, where mean and standard devi-
ation are estimated over timesteps to represent the whole ut-
terance [31] after frame-level features are extracted from a
ResNet34. Table 1 contains the model parameters of a Mean-
Std ResNet. Since the pooling layer accounts for variable length
input, we train Mean-Std ResNet with the whole utterance.
Both CQCC and logpsec were used, while each minibatch con-
tains 64 and 32 full utterances, respectively.
Dilated ResNet: Following previous work [20], we applied
Dilated ResNet to ASVspoof 2019. Different from Mean-Std
ResNet, Dilated ResNet contains a dilated convolution layer in
each residual block [32]. We also extended the original dilated
residual block to multiple residual units. Figure 2 is a sketch of
the Dilated ResNet, and Table 1 contains its model parameters.
Contrary to Mean-Std ResNet, Dilated ResNet does not have
Table 1: Model parameters of SENet34, SENet50, Mean-Std
ResNet, and Dilated ResNet. BN stands for a bottleneck resid-
ual block. Basic and Bottleneck residual blocks are described
in the original ResNet [27].
Model Config. Block1 Block2 Block3 Block4
unit type Basic Basic Basic Basic
SENet34 num. of unit 3 4 6 3
channels 16 32 64 128
unit type BN BN BN BN
SENet50 num. of unit 3 4 6 3
channels 16 32 64 128
unit type Basic Basic Basic Basic
Mean-Std num. of unit 3 4 6 3
ResNet dilation rate 1 1 1 1
channels 16 32 64 128
unit type Basic Basic Basic Basic
Dilated num. of unit 5 5 5 5
ResNet dilation rate 2 4 4 8
channels 8 16 32 64
any pooling layer and thus only accepts fixed-size input. We
trained Dilated ResNet with the same condition as the SENets.
Attentive-Filtering Network: Lastly, we applied Attentive-
Filtering Network to ASVspoof 2019, in which an attention-
based feature masking is applied prior to a Dilated ResNet [20].
The feature masking is comprised of four downsampling and
four upsampling units. The downsampling unit is based on
max-pooling and dilated convolution layers, while the upsam-
pling unit is based on convolution and bilinear upsampling lay-
ers. The number of channels for all convolution is set to 8, and
the final non-linearity is selected as the sigmoid function. Skip
connections are included between downsampled and upsampled
intermediate representations. Furthermore, we also extended
the original attentive-filtering proposed in [20] by replacing the
bilinear upsampling method by transpose convolution and self-
attention [33]. We only reported results with bilinear upsam-
pling in this paper. Figure 2 is a visualization of the compo-
sition of Attentive-Filtering Network. Attentive-Filtering Net-
work was trained under the same condition as the SENets.
2.3. Network Optimization
We present the optimization schemes used for training all the
DNN models described above.
Training Objective: The objective of anti-spoofing is to clas-
sify whether an utterance is bonafide or spoofed. A straight for-
ward training objective is, therefore, binary classification [19,
20]. [24] showed that it could be beneficial to optimize the net-
works by classifying noise classes in audio replay, so we further
trained our models with multi-class classification. We designed
the multi-class labels as the conditions spoofed utterances are
generated. For LA, this is simply the system ID (bonafide,
SS 1, SS 2, SS 4, US 1, VC 1, VC 4) e.g. SS 1 corresponds
to “system using neural-network acoustic models and WaveNet
vocoder.” For PA, spoofed utterances are recorded under differ-
ent environment IDs and attack IDs. In this work, we adopted
attack ID (bonafide, AA, AB, AC, BA, BB, BC, CA, CB, CC)
as the multi-class label. Table 2 gives a comparison between
the multi-class classification labels between condition LA and
PA. For computing EER during inference stage, we took the
log-probability of the bonafide class as the score for utterance.
Table 2: Multi-class labels for LA and PA.
data condition LA PA
num. of classes 7 10
label type system IDs attack IDs
label
descriptions
bonafide, SS 1
SS 2, SS 4
US 1, VC 1, VC 4
bonafide, AA, AB
AC, BA, BB
BC, CA, CB, CC
Optimizer: We followed the optimization strategy described
in [33]. The DNN models are optimized by Adam with β1 =
0.9, β2 = 0.98, and weight decay 10−9. The learning rate
scheduler increases the learning rate linearly for the first 1000
warm-up steps and then decreases it proportionally to the in-
verse square root of the step number [33]. Finally, after every
training epoch, we selected the best model by two means: dev
EER or dev classification accuracy of the class labels.
2.4. Fusion and Calibration
We followed the greedy fusion scheme described in [30] to se-
lect the best system combination for our primary submission
for ASVspoof 2019. Fusion and calibration were performed
with logistic regression with the Bosaris toolkit [34]. Consider-
ing the priors defined in the evaluation plan, we set the effective
prior to 0.672 for PA and the effective prior to 0.707 for LA.
3. Experiments
3.1. Baseline System
LFCC-GMM and CQCC-GMM: The official baseline sys-
tems are based on a 20 dimension linear frequency cepstral co-
efficients (LFCC) [6] and a 30 dimension constant Q cepstral
coefficients (CQCC) [5], both of which included static, delta
and double delta coefficients. The backend is a 2-class GMM
with 512 components.
i-vectors: We implemented i-vectors [28] as previous work has
demonstrated that i-vectors yield better results than GMM in
anti-spoofing [4, 15]. We experimented with a 100-dimension
i-vectors with 64-component UBM and a 200-dimension i-
vectors with 128-component UBM. The i-vector extractors
were trained on 30-dimension CQCC features, and the backend
for our i-vectors is a Gaussian linear generative model [35].
3.2. Experimental Setup
Dataset: All experiments in this work were conducted under
the ASVspoof 2019 Challenge. The ASVspoof 2019 corpus is
divided into two subsets: PA and LA. PA contains 48600 spoof
and 5400 bonafide utterances in the training partition, 24300
spoof and 5400 bonafide utterances in the development parti-
tion. The spoofed utterances were recorded under are 27 differ-
ent acoustic and 9 replay configurations. LA contains 22800
spoof and 2580 bonafide utterances in the training partition,
22296 spoof and 2548 bonafide utterances in the development
partition. The spoofed utterances were generated according to
2 VC and 4 TTS algorithms.
Evaluation Metric: We evaluated the effectiveness of spoofing
countermeasures with the minimum normalized tandem detec-
tion cost function (t-DCF) [36] and EER. t-DCF takes into ac-
count of the detection error rates of a fixed automatic speaker
verification system, provided by the organizers in the case of
Table 3: Ablation study of single system results on ASVspoof 2019. Due to space constraint, for each DNN model, we merely included
top two performing systems in the table. Under Training Objective column, MCE stands for multi-class cross entropy, BCE stands for
binary cross entropy, and acc/EER stands for the model selection criterion after each training epoch.
Model Acoustic Feature Training Model PA development LA development
Feature Engineering Objective Params. t-DCFminnorm EER (%) t-DCFminnorm EER (%)
CQCC-GMM CQCC + ∆ + ∆∆ N/A EM 138k 0.195 9.87 0.012 0.43
LFCC-GMM LFCC + ∆ + ∆∆ N/A EM 92k 0.255 11.96 0.066 2.71
100-i-vectors CQCC + ∆ + ∆∆ N/A EM 593k 0.306 12.37 0.155 5.18
200-i-vectors CQCC + ∆ + ∆∆ N/A EM 2339k 0.322 12.52 0.121 4.12
SENet34 logspec unifed, L=200 BCE + acc. 1344k 0.015 0.575 0 0
logspec unifed, L=200 BCE + EER 1344k 0.017 0.686 0 0
SENet50 logspec unifed, L=200 MCE + EER 1095k 0.021 0.799 0 0
logspec unifed, L=200 BCE + EER 1093k 0.017 0.631 0 0
Mean-Std logspec whole BCE + acc. 1389k 0.022 0.832 0 0
ResNet CQCC whole MCE + acc. 1390k 0.041 1.429 0.001 0.040
Dilated logspec unifed, L=200 MCE + EER 593k 0.029 1.072 0 0
ResNet logspec unifed, L=200 BCE + EER 592k 0.024 0.780 0 0
Attentive- logspec unifed, L=200 MCE + EER 600k 0.027 1.057 0 0
Filteirng Net logspec unifed, L=200 BCE + acc. 599k 0.021 0.740 0 0
ASVspoof 2019 Challenge.
Implementation: We used training partition to train our DNN
models. Development partition was used for model selection
during validation and system combination. We did not use any
external data or data augmentation technique for development.
CQCC-GMM and LFCC-GMM were adopted directly from the
MATLAB script2. Acoustic features and i-vectors were ex-
tracted with Kaldi [37]. DNNs were implemented in PyTorch.
3.3. Experimental Results of Single Systems
Table 3 compares ASSERT with the baseline systems in spoof-
ing countermeasure on the dev partition. The first observation is
that the i-vectors baseline performed worse than GMMs surpris-
ingly, which is contrary to prior work on the ASVspoof 2017
corpus [4, 15]. ASSERT attains substantial improvements from
the baseline GMM and i-vectors systems on both PA and LA. In
general, for training the proposed DNN models, logspec outper-
forms CQCC, and unified feature map with overlap outperforms
without overlap and whole utterance. On the other hand, there
are mixed results on using multi-task or binary training objec-
tive, and on model selection with dev EER or dev classification
accuracy. We empirically found that the best single system is
based on SENet34 trained with unified feature map with over-
lap of logspec and binary cross-entropy loss with dev accuracy
model selection. The system obtains 92% and 94% relative im-
provements over CQCC-GMM on dev t-DCF and EER for PA,
and 100% relative improvements for LA.
3.4. Evaluation Results
Table 4 is the summary of our primary and single system sub-
mission to the ASVspoof 2019 Challenge. The single system is
based on SENet34 (logspec), and the primary system is a system
combination of five single systems based on SENet34 (logspec),
Mean-Std ResNet (CQCC, logspec), SENet50 (logspec) and Di-
lated ResNet (logspec). Systems are trained separately for PA
2http://www.asvspoof.org
Table 4: Primary, single and baseline systems for ASVspoof
2019. Single system is based on SENet34; primary system is
a fusion of five systems based on: SENet34, Mean-Std ResNet
(CQCC, logspec), SENet50 and Dilated ResNet.
System Development Evaluation
t-DCFminnorm EER t-DCFminnorm EER
PA-single 0.015 0.575 0.036 1.29
PA-primary 0.003 0.129 0.016 0.59
PA-baseline 0.195 9.87 0.245 11.04
LA-single 0 0 0.216 11.75
LA-primary 0 0 0.155 6.70
LA-baseline 0.066 2.71 0.212 8.09
and LA. We can observe that ASSERT generalizes well across
dev and eval for PA, nevertheless, it overfits on dev for LA. Our
primary system further gains 93% and 95% relative improve-
ments over CQCC-GMM on eval t-DCF and EER for PA, and
27% and 17% relative improvements over LFCC-GMM on eval
t-DCF and EER for LA.
4. Conclusions
We introduced ASSERT – several variants of squeeze-excitation
and residual networks, optimization and fusion schemes, along
with feature engineering approaches – for anti-spoofing. Our
fusion system attained considerable improvement over baseline
systems on the ASVspoof 2019 corpus. We believe this paper
serves as a preliminary work on a more comprehensive study
on DNN based countermeasures for speech spoofing attacks,
while meta-data analysis and model refinements on LA should
be further investigated.
Acknowledgments The authors thank ASVspoof 2019 com-
mittee for designing the corpus and organizing the challenge.
5. References
[1] Z. Wu, N. Evans, T. Kinnunen, J. Yamagishi, F. Alegre, and H. Li,
“Spoofing and countermeasures for speaker verification: A sur-
vey,” speech communication, vol. 66, pp. 130–153, 2015.
[2] N. W. Evans, T. Kinnunen, and J. Yamagishi, “Spoofing and coun-
termeasures for automatic speaker verification.” in Interspeech,
2013, pp. 925–929.
[3] Z. Wu, T. Kinnunen, N. Evans, J. Yamagishi, C. Hanilc¸i,
M. Sahidullah, and A. Sizov, “Asvspoof 2015: the first automatic
speaker verification spoofing and countermeasures challenge,” in
Sixteenth Annual Conference of the International Speech Commu-
nication Association, 2015.
[4] H. Delgado, M. Todisco, M. Sahidullah, N. Evans, T. Kinnunen,
K. Lee, and J. Yamagishi, “Asvspoof 2017 version 2.0: meta-
data analysis and baseline enhancements,” in Odyssey 2018 The
Speaker and Language Recognition Workshop, 2018.
[5] M. Todisco, H. Delgado, and N. Evans, “A new feature for auto-
matic speaker verification anti-spoofing: Constant q cepstral co-
efficients,” in Speaker Odyssey Workshop, Bilbao, Spain, vol. 25,
2016, pp. 249–252.
[6] M. Sahidullah, T. Kinnunen, and C. Hanilc¸i, “A comparison of
features for synthetic speech detection,” 2015.
[7] M. J. Alam, G. Bhattacharya, and P. Kenny, “Boosting the per-
formance of spoofing detection systems on replay attacks us-
ing q-logarithm domain feature normalization,” in Proc. Odyssey
2018 The Speaker and Language Recognition Workshop, 2018,
pp. 393–398.
[8] M. Saranya and H. A. Murthy, “Decision-level feature switching
as a paradigm for replay attack detection.”
[9] G. Suthokumar, V. Sethu, C. Wijenayake, and E. Ambikairajah,
“Modulation dynamic features for the detection of replay attacks,”
in Proc. Interspeech, 2018, pp. 691–695.
[10] H. Sailor, M. Kamble, and H. Patil, “Auditory filterbank learning
for temporal modulation features in replay spoof speech detec-
tion,” in Proc. Interspeech, 2018, pp. 666–670.
[11] L.-W. Chen, W. Guo, and L.-R. Dai, “Speaker verification against
synthetic speech,” in 2010 7th International Symposium on Chi-
nese Spoken Language Processing. IEEE, 2010, pp. 309–312.
[12] P. L. D. Leon, B. Stewart, and J. Yamagishi, “Synthetic speech
discrimination using pitch pattern statistics derived from image
analysis,” in Thirteenth Annual Conference of the International
Speech Communication Association, 2012.
[13] Z. Wu, E. S. Chng, and H. Li, “Detecting converted speech and
natural speech for anti-spoofing attack in speaker recognition,” in
Thirteenth Annual Conference of the International Speech Com-
munication Association, 2012.
[14] Z. Wu, X. Xiao, E. S. Chng, and H. Li, “Synthetic speech de-
tection using temporal modulation feature,” in 2013 IEEE Inter-
national Conference on Acoustics, Speech and Signal Processing.
IEEE, 2013, pp. 7234–7238.
[15] M. Adiban, H. Sameti, N. Maghsoodi, and S. Shahsavari, “Sut
system description for anti-spoofing 2017 challenge,” in Proceed-
ings of the 29th Conference on Computational Linguistics and
Speech Processing (ROCLING 2017), 2017, pp. 264–275.
[16] Z. Wu, T. Kinnunen, E. S. Chng, H. Li, and E. Ambikairajah, “A
study on spoofing attack in state-of-the-art speaker verification:
the telephone speech case,” in Proceedings of The 2012 Asia Pa-
cific Signal and Information Processing Association Annual Sum-
mit and Conference. IEEE, 2012, pp. 1–5.
[17] E. Khoury, T. Kinnunen, A. Sizov, Z. Wu, and S. Marcel, “Intro-
ducing i-vectors for joint anti-spoofing and speaker verification,”
in Fifteenth Annual Conference of the International Speech Com-
munication Association, 2014.
[18] N. Chen, Y. Qian, H. Dinkel, B. Chen, and K. Yu, “Robust deep
feature for spoofing detectionthe sjtu system for asvspoof 2015
challenge,” in Sixteenth Annual Conference of the International
Speech Communication Association, 2015.
[19] G. Lavrentyeva, S. Novoselov, E. Malykh, A. Kozlov, O. Kuda-
shev, and V. Shchemelinin, “Audio replay attack detection with
deep learning frameworks.” in Interspeech, 2017, pp. 82–86.
[20] C.-I. Lai, A. Abad, K. Richmond, J. Yamagishi, N. Dehak, and
S. King, “Attentive filtering networks for audio replay attack de-
tection,” in 2019 IEEE International Conference on Acoustics,
Speech and Signal Processing (ICASSP). IEEE, 2019.
[21] G. Valenti, H. Delgado, M. Todisco, N. Evans, and L. Pilati,
“An end-to-end spoofing countermeasure for automatic speaker
verification using evolving recurrent neural networks,” in Proc.
Odyssey 2018 The Speaker and Language Recognition Workshop,
2018, pp. 288–295.
[22] Z. Chen, Z. Xie, W. Zhang, and X. Xu, “Resnet and model fusion
for automatic spoofing detection.” in INTERSPEECH, 2017, pp.
102–106.
[23] B. Chettri, S. Mishra, B. L. Sturm, and E. Benetos, “A study
on convolutional neural network based end-to-end replay anti-
spoofing,” arXiv preprint arXiv:1805.09164, 2018.
[24] H.-J. Shim, J.-W. Jung, H.-S. Heo, S.-H. Yoon, and H.-J. Yu, “Re-
play spoofing detection system for automatic speaker verification
using multi-task learning of noise classes,” in 2018 Conference on
Technologies and Applications of Artificial Intelligence (TAAI).
IEEE, 2018, pp. 172–176.
[25] Y. Qian, N. Chen, and K. Yu, “Deep features for automatic spoof-
ing detection,” Speech Communication, vol. 85, pp. 43–52, 2016.
[26] J. Hu, L. Shen, and G. Sun, “Squeeze-and-excitation networks,”
in Proceedings of the IEEE conference on computer vision and
pattern recognition, 2018, pp. 7132–7141.
[27] K. He, X. Zhang, S. Ren, and J. Sun, “Deep residual learning
for image recognition,” in Proceedings of the IEEE conference on
computer vision and pattern recognition, 2016, pp. 770–778.
[28] N. Dehak, P. J. Kenny, R. Dehak, P. Dumouchel, and P. Ouellet,
“Front-end factor analysis for speaker verification,” IEEE Trans-
actions on Audio, Speech, and Language Processing, vol. 19,
no. 4, pp. 788–798, 2011.
[29] W. Cai, Z. Cai, X. Zhang, X. Wang, and M. Li, “A novel learnable
dictionary encoding layer for end-to-end language identification,”
in 2018 IEEE International Conference on Acoustics, Speech and
Signal Processing (ICASSP). IEEE, 2018, pp. 5189–5193.
[30] J. Villalba, N. Chen, D. Snyder, D. Garcia-Romero, A. McCree,
G. Sell, J. Borgstrom, F. Richardson, S. Shon, F. Grondin et al.,
“The jhu-mit system description for nist sre18.”
[31] D. Snyder, D. Garcia-Romero, G. Sell, D. Povey, and S. Khudan-
pur, “X-vectors: Robust dnn embeddings for speaker recognition,”
in 2018 IEEE International Conference on Acoustics, Speech and
Signal Processing (ICASSP).
[32] F. Yu and V. Koltun, “Multi-scale context aggregation by dilated
convolutions,” arXiv preprint arXiv:1511.07122, 2015.
[33] A. Vaswani, N. Shazeer, N. Parmar, J. Uszkoreit, L. Jones, A. N.
Gomez, Ł. Kaiser, and I. Polosukhin, “Attention is all you need,”
in Advances in Neural Information Processing Systems, 2017, pp.
5998–6008.
[34] N. Bru¨mmer and E. De Villiers, “The bosaris toolkit: Theory,
algorithms and code for surviving the new dcf,” arXiv preprint
arXiv:1304.2865, 2013.
[35] D. Martinez, O. Plchot, L. Burget, O. Glembek, and P. Mateˇjka,
“Language recognition in ivectors space,” in Twelfth Annual Con-
ference of the International Speech Communication Association,
2011.
[36] T. Kinnunen, K. A. Lee, H. Delgado, N. Evans, M. Todisco,
M. Sahidullah, J. Yamagishi, and D. A. Reynolds, “t-dcf: a de-
tection cost function for the tandem assessment of spoofing coun-
termeasures and automatic speaker verification,” arXiv preprint
arXiv:1804.09618, 2018.
[37] D. Povey, A. Ghoshal, G. Boulianne, L. Burget, O. Glembek,
N. Goel, M. Hannemann, P. Motlicek, Y. Qian, P. Schwarz et al.,
“The kaldi speech recognition toolkit,” IEEE Signal Processing
Society, Tech. Rep., 2011.
